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Playing in the sandbox: statebuilding in the space of non-recognition 
 
Recognition of sovereign statehood is the final obstacle facing those political entities in the 
international system that want to be states. For unrecognised states – those political entities 
existent within the international system that are states in everything but legal standing – 
recognition of sovereign statehood is the ultimate goal. In these entities the ‘state’ exists long 
before legal standing is granted, and is widely seen as a precondition of recognition. Because 
of this, although the very act of granting recognition imparts a drastic change in the juridical 
legality and placement of the political entity under question, drastic empirical change is 
unlikely in what are already developed political systems. For unrecognised states, the 
existence of the ‘state’ is a pre-condition for the ultimate goal of recognized sovereign 
statehood. For most unrecognised states recognition continues to be the Holy Grail, a 
mythical achievement that will exist only as an aspiration. Regardless, the quest for 
recognition, and existence within the space of non-recognition, carries powerful political 
agency within these unrecognised states. 
 
Although recognition is the ultimate goal for these state-like entities, and it can 
certainly act as a stabilizing factor,1 the period of non-recognition offers a period of relative 
autonomy, allowing for necessary internal processes to take place with minimal direct 
external involvement. It is a period when liberation movements can use isolation to establish 
the narrative, the identity, and the structure of the state and to form the institutions of 
government and governance. It is this period that provides the foundations for external 
interaction, whether that is the quest for full or for partial recognition. It is in this period that 
the state is born. Based in understandings of statebuilding, this article examines a side to 
recognition that is often overlooked: the political space of non-recognition. The attempt here 
is not to squeeze all cases into a box or to homogenise political entities. However, similarities 
in the socio-political space of these entities2 is too analytically significant to ignore. Whilst 
utilizing the examples of Somaliland and Kurdistan through the lens of statebuilding, this 
article considers the role of non-recognition in the development of society-state relations in 
the new ‘states’ in terms of flexibility of state, identity, and ultimately resilience.3  
 
Recognition, Non-Recognition and Unrecognised States 
In his early work on what he termed ‘de facto states’, Pegg defines these entities as: 
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entities which feature long-term, effective, and popularly-supported organized 
political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population 
in a defined territorial area. They seek international recognition and view 
themselves as capable of meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood. They 
are, however, unable to secure widespread juridical recognition and therefore 
function outside the boundaries of international legitimacy.4 
 
Caspersen and Stansfield expand on this, identifying three criteria that define unrecognised 
states. First, these entities must have ‘de facto independence, including territorial control, and 
have managed to maintain this for at least two years’. Second, they cannot have gained 
recognition of sovereign statehood, even if they have been recognized by individual states or 
blocs of states, meaning that they are not ‘full members of the international system of 
sovereign states’. Most unrecognised states have some form of partial or informal recognition 
in that an individual state or bloc of states interacts with it on a state-like level. However, 
without recognition of sovereignty by the community of states, they remain ‘non-states’. 
Finally, unrecognised states must have a clear desire to be fully independent from the state 
from which they are separating (parent state), meaning they are seeking full legal recognition 
of sovereign statehood.5 This final point highlights commonalities amongst the wide variety 
of entities considered to be unrecognised states: they are engaged in the complex socio-
political process of statebuilding.6 Interestingly, within the definitions who wants 
independence – the population or the political elite – is not clearly addressed, and as Pegg 
concedes, it is ‘extremely difficult to discern what a movement’s true goals really are.’7 
However, as will be examined in following sections, it can be assumed that the continued 
process of statebuilding demonstrates a significant degree of societal acceptance of the 
separate entity and its continuing existence as a territory seeking recognition. Indeed, the 
criterion for seeking recognition – and the lengthy process of doing so – distinguishes 
between those entities within states that are seeking a degree of autonomy and those that are 
seeking statehood. Within these definitions is the recognition that the process of statebuilding 
has begun and the process is a continuing one. These entities claim not only independence for 
a territory, but they claim independent statehood and are seeking for that to be recognised.8 
Unlike larger, externally-led statebuilding projects, those in unrecognised states are self-led 
and undertaken in an environment of relative isolation and from the international system of 
states. Indeed, as King notes, ‘the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the 
statebuilders of the early 2000s’, creating territorial areas whose empirical attributes are 
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‘about as well developed as that of the recognized states of which they are still notionally a 
part.’9 
 
Recognition is an ambiguous term.10 Some unrecognised states, such as South Ossetia 
(Russia), Nagorno Karabakh (Armenia), and Abkhazia (Russia), have strong patron states 
from whom they seek assistance and support, creating relationships that can be deemed 
partial or informal recognition. Others, such as Somaliland, do not, although this does not 
mean it does not also enjoy partial recognition, as Ethiopia and Djibouti have strong, yet 
informal, relationships with the territory. Kurdistan has been able to utilize the powers given 
to it by federalism in order to cultivate links with the international business community and 
strategic national investors, carving out an independent profile in trade by striking deals with 
neighbouring Turkey on energy and frequently visiting the World Economic Forum.11 
Although it is seeking approval for its status from key international actors, in these 
interactions it is not able to act as an independent state. When discussing recognition, what is 
referred to here is what Caspersen and Stansfield allude to as full or sovereign recognition: 
international recognition of sovereign statehood rather than recognition of the existence of a 
political entity.12 However, vague and inconsistent legal and quantifiable standards and 
precedents surround how much recognition, and by whom, equates to the granting of 
sovereignty. There are no concrete or static rules as to how this recognition takes place, and 
indeed, as Caspersen notes, the rules of recognition have changed over time.13 However, in 
discussions it is generally noted that full recognition means acceptance by a ‘critical mass’ of 
states,14 or the opportunity to join international institutions, such as the UN or institutional 
legal frameworks, as a full state member.15 
 
Lack of sovereign recognition brings significant detriments for the entities in question 
and their populations. Despite increasing international attention to many such as Kurdistan, 
Somaliland and Kosovo, the connotation of danger and deviance still remains attached to 
these ‘breakaway’ entities.16 Because of their placement both within and outside the confines 
of a recognized state, many of these entities exist within the condition of unresolved 
conflict.17 Further, even if peaceful, not being ‘a state’ means being excluded from many 
systemic interactions. Unrecognised states are not subject to international legal frameworks, 
even if the governments abide by the conditions of them. There are business opportunities 
and security considerations for the government and the people, and for some little or no 
access to passport services means a limit to travel. This is especially the case for those 
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unrecognised states with no or contentious relationships with their parent state. Further, 
normative demands that dictate peaceful liberal democracies mean the ‘state’ cannot be 
characterized by strong-arm tactics and authoritarian rule. Because of this, unrecognised 
statehood demands a high level of domestic legitimacy and support.18 If long-awaited and 
often long promised recognition does not come, less tangible factors such as nation-building, 
identity and cohesion can also suffer, thus creating the potential for a state-society disconnect 
and instability.19 As Caspersen notes, unrecognised states ‘all find themselves in a position of 
limbo’, striving to maintain a state-like political entity without the benefits of a place within 
the international system of states.20 Political pressures and demands from both outside and 
within are intense, yet chances for recognition are remote.21 This state of suspended 
animation places limitations and boundaries on the socio-political development and evolution 
of a state, its institutions, its practices, and its identity.  
 
Recognition of sovereignty does not make a state ‘good,’ just as non-recognition does 
not make a state ‘bad’.22 What recognition is is acceptance: it is acceptance into the club of 
statehood and all that goes with it. Recognition might legally bestow statehood upon a 
political entity, but it does not make ‘the state’. Despite this, in the study of unrecognised 
states there is the expected pre-condition of ‘stateness’ in order for an entity to be considered 
an unrecognised state. Even in the most basic definitions and criteria for an entity to be 
considered an unrecognised state there is a demand for state-like existence during a period of 
non-recognition. In their criteria, Caspersen and Stansfield stipulate what appears to be an 
arbitrary two years of existence as a state-like entity for the territory to be considered an 
unrecognised state.23 Whilst analytically useful for the purposes of categorization, the time 
frame itself is less important than what it indicates; it is in this period that secessionist 
movements are separated from unrecognised states and that warlords or rebels turn into 
statebuilders.24 Unrecognised states must exist as states prior to the legal granting of 
statehood. It is in this space of non-recognition that statebuilding takes place and the ‘state’ is 
made. 
 
Statebuilding, statehood, and demands 
States and state-like entities cannot function in isolation in today’s increasingly 
interconnected world. Even those not in direct contact with international institutions, 
developmental organizations or the system of states are still subject to being externally 
influenced by normative standards and policy precedents. In the realm of statebuilding and 
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political development, international norms of what it means to be an acceptable or successful 
state impact upon both external action and domestic policy within developing states and, in 
particular, unrecognised states. For the latter, conforming to acceptable standards of 
statehood is perceived to be vital to attracting and maximizing investment and developmental 
assistance that can only be obtained following recognition of sovereignty. For some, 
therefore, the style and functions of the state become a tool for economic and political 
survival.25 
 
In statebuilding, the frameworks of good governance are seen as ‘a “silver bullet” 
capable of assisting states in coping with the problems of our complex globalised world’.26 
Rooted in the belief that liberal democracy is inevitable given the chance, the approach to 
externally-led statebuilding is one dominated by building institutions as the means through 
which to bring stability, security, development, peace, and provision.27 It is highly political 
and may include some deference to local considerations, but the project itself best reflects 
external demands, agendas, and requirements – a checklist of sorts.28 The expectation is that 
after a short period of time, a stable political entity will stay standing and will be handed over 
to local leaders, at which point local ownership and societal acceptance are supposed to take 
place.29 However, when looking at unrecognised states, as Kolstø notes, the process of 
statebuilding is reversed:  local ownership and domestic support precede and thus exist in 
tandem with the building of the state.30 In unrecognised states, especially those in which a 
strong patron state does not exist, a different form of statebuilding can be seen, one that 
exhibits flexibility and latitude because of non-recognition. Recognition is the odd bedfellow 
of non-recognition, and in statebuilding in unrecognised states both are vital and powerful 
components of the process, the strategies, and the identities created. Non-recognition and the 
space around it provide for an alternative, and potentially more stable, form of statebuilding. 
 
Conditionality, Flexibility, and the Space of Non-Recognition  
Unrecognised states look and act like states that comply with the norms of acceptable 
statehood; doing so is internally perceived to increase the chances of recognition. Although 
claims for recognition vary from entity to entity and some have evolved over time,31 
generally unrecognised states play by the rules and posit themselves as ‘good’ states in order 
to ‘prove’ their statehood. As such, the outcome is pre-determined. However, because of their 
relative isolation, abiding by international norms does not define the socio-political processes 
taking place. The ongoing process of statebuilding in an unrecognised state is underpinned 
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and dictated by the mutually constitutive relationship between the quest for recognition and 
the need for continued stability and existence as a ‘state’. In the language of acceptable 
liberal statehood, the expected outcomes for unrecognised states and those being rebuilt, 
developed, or strengthened through external intervention are the same. However, without 
direct involvement and intervention in the project and the process, statebuilding in 
unrecognised states takes place with a degree of latitude and flexibility in the process that is 
not available in interventionist projects in recognized states. This relative flexibility is 
possible because of, not in spite of, non-recognition.32 
 
Conditionality is a complex beast in both direct and indirect international intervention, 
especially in statebuilding. In interventionist statebuilding, external conditionality is 
dominant and dictatorial: conditionality is attached to the process as well as the outcome. In 
addition to the external demands of international actors and expectations, though, states are 
also subject to conditionality from within. Because of the goal of recognition, unrecognised 
states still operate within the normative frameworks of the international system – those 
frameworks dictating external expectations of what the state should be and how it should act 
– and are thus subject to a form of external conditionality in their statebuilding processes. 
However, their non-recognized standing means that at least formally they exist and operate 
outside of the institutional frameworks. Here external conditionality is indirect and normative 
in nature – it becomes expectations rather than demands – allowing for flexibility in the 
process.33 At the same time, stability and continuation of the process is dependent upon 
maintaining domestic support through both meeting as well as shaping internal demands and 
expectations of the state. Thus, with recognition of sovereignty as the end goal, in this form 
of statebuilding external expectations must balance with the internal. If we think of this form 
of statebuilding as overlapping spheres, the space where the external and internal 
conditionalities overlap is the space of non-recognition. 
 
Statebuilding encompasses a struggle among actors over the socio-political power to 
govern and the distribution of that power. This struggle takes place not only between 
domestic actors both inside and outside of the state, but also ‘between international 
preferences and local preferences’.34 In maintaining a technocratic and institutional approach, 
externally-led statebuilding fails to recognize and accommodate these power struggles, thus 
creating obstacles for legitimizing the state and for sustaining stability. Domestically-led 
statebuilding projects are not immune from these struggles. In many ways they are more 
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susceptible to them and the potential for fragility that they bring. However, this fragility is 
counter-balanced by the flexibility that non-recognition brings. The space of non-recognition 
allows unrecognised states to exhibit a degree of flexibility not seen in external projects; that, 
in combination with other powerful factors such as the quest for recognition, allows for the 
potentially ‘ill-suited’ foreign model of statehood and practice not to be discounted but rather 
to be negotiated with local necessities, local institutions, and local mechanisms of 
governance. The necessary balance that must be reached between external expectations and 
internal necessities is possible because of non-intervention found within the space of non-
recognition, and a balance that provides stability to the ongoing socio-political process of 
statebuilding. The flexibility that non-recognition allows, for example, can be seen in the 
political settlement in Somaliland. The incorporation of clan governance structures into 
central government sits outside of established practice for externally-led statebuilding 
projects. However, the utilization of clan governance served as a mechanism for stability and 
legitimization and was therefore central to statebuilding in Somaliland, including to the 
introduction of democracy and ‘modern’ governance.35 The flexibility afforded in the 
establishment of its institutions and practices allowed Somaliland to respond to what was 
domestically necessary as a means through which to achieve what was externally preferred.  
Similarly, Kurdistan has projected a modern image of statehood internationally while 
utilizing the flexibility of an absence of sovereignty through the 1990s and quasi-
independence after 2003 to develop models of governance that reflect local power structures. 
This incorporation of the local allowed Kurdistan to survive a civil war in the 1990s and the 
collapse of the Iraqi state after 2003. But large scale public demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah 
in 2011 and the electoral success in 2013 of political parties committed to reforming the 
current constitutional settlement should caution us from seeing flexibility as a “silver bullet.” 
Non-recognition provides flexibility in statebuilding but it does not preclude errors and 
mistakes being made, however, the local ownership of the process appears to allow for 
greater debate and alterations to the state settlement that is being constructed.    
 
Non-recognition and identity 
While non-recognition provides the possibility of flexibility within domestically-led 
statebuilding projects, it is not a panacea. Difficult questions remain, not least, why should 
the state exist? Successful states foster a sense of identity and attachment among their 
populations. The state is not only institutions; it is also what Buzan considers the idea of the 
state.36 In this, the state is an abstract that reflects and embodies the political culture of a 
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territory and its population. Physically, the state can be identified by its foundations of 
government, territory, and population, yet as Buzan notes, it is more a ‘metaphysical entity, 
an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a physical organism’.37 Similar to 
Anderson’s imagined communities,38 this idea of the state binds together a population, 
cyclically determined by and determining the population’s expectations of the political entity 
encompassing it. The basis of this attachment is not a definitive science and can be the result 
of multiple sources, whether linked to factors such as ethnicity, ideology, collective history, 
or cultural values. The resulting narrative, and identity, therefore, reflect the needs, desires, 
and expectations of the population: it is a process of nation-building taking place within the 
confines of the state. This then reflects back into domestic conditionality in the ongoing 
process of statebuilding, with successful states using their institutions to both reflect and also 
reinforce this identity. States that create stability and foster a shared identity among their 
people can be identified; however, the path toward this achievement is not uniform. 
 
While the ultimate goal for unrecognised states is recognition of sovereign statehood, 
the process towards this begins with building internal support for separation. As the quest for 
recognition continues, identity and narrative become both a benefit and a necessity stemming 
from the condition of non-recognition. In addition to a picture presented externally, an 
internal narrative also develops to suggest possible answers to the question, why should this 
state exist? The case for a separate state can begin through a shared and evolving history. 
This is the basis for Anderson’s and Buzan’s characterizations of ideational and imagined 
states. Writing about ethnic conflict, Brown also highlights the role of shared histories in 
shaping identity and separateness.39 For many unrecognised states, at the core of creating or 
strengthening an identity is a belief that the new territory will be better at representing the 
interests of its population than the parent state. In both cases referred to here, the parent 
government is and has been dysfunctional or violent, and the people of the unrecognised state 
historically have struggled to be heard in government or excluded from power. In creating an 
identity initially based on victimhood and discrimination, the foundations of a separate nation 
– one that cannot rejoin with its parent state – are established. In the cases considered here the 
population’s attachment to a new state is the result of a combination of factors, but in both it 
centres on ideas of separateness. For these cases, the narrative of the state and the identity it 
underpins serves to justify the existence of the entity and thus to legitimize the process of 
building a new state. As the statebuilding process continues and evolves, the narrative of the 
state and its identity also change and evolve to reflect the changing socio-political dynamics 
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informing societal expectations of the state. For Somaliland, societal investment in the 
statebuilding process started with shared pain stemming from Siad Barre’s brutal campaigns 
during the civil war. Today, though, it has evolved to center on the idea of ‘this is necessary 
to achieve what we want, and we’re all in it together’.40 The ‘want’ here is a separate state. 
There is an outward recognition in Somaliland that a peaceful and stable liberal democracy is 
a necessary condition for acceptance as a state and, especially, tangible benefits such as 
increased trade and travel that this will bring. Although expectations of democratic 
government are increasing in Somaliland, the underlying ‘want’ was not centred on style of 
governance but rather opportunity brought about by recognition of sovereign statehood. This 
is perhaps best epitomized by a market trader in Hargeisa who, when asked what he wanted 
the state to be, stated that it should provide him with a passport.41 Underpinned by narratives 
about democracy and liberal statehood, the Somaliland identity involves a strong expectation 
of recognition. It is this expectation that facilitates societal investment in political action 
deemed necessary to fulfilling the goal.  
 
The space of non-recognition relies on continued momentum of the project for 
recognition. The ruling body is supported because of its quest for recognition, but in turn it 
must reassure the populace that progress towards this goal is being made. Within this, 
identity, narratives, and nation-building become cornerstones of the statebuilding process. 
The identities that emerge for both Somaliland and Kurdistan are an implicit rejection of 
Somalia and Iraq; however, to build support for a new autonomy requires more than a 
rejection of Mogadishu or Baghdad. The identities that have emerged in both territories are 
the result of a myriad of factors, including shared histories that are invoked as a point of 
cohesion. These identities have also emerged out of internal debates about how the state 
should be organized and an external projection to the international community of the values 
of the new ‘state’. These processes are a form of non-ethnic nation-building that serves to not 
only unite the population but also to define them. These processes are central to sustaining 
statebuilding in the space of non-recognition. 
 
Kurdistan demonstrates the evolution of narratives from a primordial nationalism to 
being the region that proved ‘Iraqis could be democratic and peace loving, given half a 
chance’.42 As such the identity that is attached to the state here is upgraded from being a 
simple recitation of ethnic demands to a set of values that can spread beyond its original core 
community. The example of Kurdistan also highlights the role that a shared history and 
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brutality play in developing identity and legitimacy. The dream of a nation-state for the 
Kurdish people gained significant leverage with the Anfal campaign, a campaign of genocide 
launched against Iraqi Kurds by Saddam Hussein in the late 1980s. This survival of brutality 
creates a strong narrative for separation, ‘for people who have known genocide there is only 
one thing that will do: a nation state of their own’.43 Carefully retold and maintained, the 
historical narrative centred on these events reminds people of the suffering previous 
generations endured, thus creating a sense of security and protection under the new 
government. In Kurdistan, the memory of the Anfal is invoked through anniversaries, 
conferences, and public history. For Somaliland, the genocidal campaign is part of the ‘story’ 
of Somaliland told to outsiders, and a constant memory is maintained in public monuments in 
the major cities. Indeed, at the top of a Google images search for ‘Hargeisa’ are pictures of 
one of Barre’s airplanes that was shot down over Hargeisa during the civil war; it is now a 
public monument. These maintained and reinforced memories are a constant reminder of the 
violence, the sacrifice, and the fight to be ‘separate’. 
 
It is possible to see historical narratives as purely a tool of political rhetoric – a story 
that is told to justify a policy that is already agreed – this underplays their ability to shape 
identity. The development of Kurdistan after self-government was bestowed on it in 1991 
was not an unalloyed success as the region was plagued by political conflicts and corruption. 
Yet, as Iraq emerged from dictatorship Kurdistan appeared as the most free, prosperous, and 
peaceful region. Even though troubled, the period of isolation that followed 1991 had allowed 
for the development of a separate and sustainable identity,44 an identity that is reflected in the 
relationship between state and society today. For Somaliland, too, the path to today has not 
been easy, yet a sense of a separate Somaliland acts as a point of cohesion: even in the 
diaspora Somalilanders are quick to refer to themselves as such rather than as ‘Somali’, thus 
reinforcing the separateness and the existence of the political entity. In unrecognised states, 
the creation and evolution of identity in this way is a form of nation-building that through 
constant reiteration is a self-perpetuating but also evolutionary process. This identity of the 
state is not static, though. For Somaliland, the rhetorical link made between democracy and 
external expectations has changed societal expectations and demands of what the state is or 
must be. Invoking the ‘we’ve been disadvantaged, harmed, hard done by or screwed’ is a 
starting point, but the ‘this is who we are and what we want to be’ reinforces the link between 
society and the statebuilding process. Whilst a shared history is a strong starting point for 
statebuilding and acts as a point of stability and support necessary in a state of non-
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recognition, it alone is not enough to indefinitely sustain an unrecognised state. Historical 
narratives and justification for statehood that rely solely on victimhood and a desire for 
community security will only take the case for statehood so far.  
 
Just as with any state, in unrecognised states the relationship between identity, the 
expectations that fosters, and the state must evolve. Unrecognised states contain an implicit 
narrative for different, often better, governance.45 Both Kurdistan and Somaliland emerged as 
state entities at points in their parent state’s history when the center was weak, and both see 
the opportunities that self-government can bring. Narratives are not solely directed inward, 
however. External narratives reinforce justifications for recognition: good governance, 
compliance, and readiness to meet international norms. Because of quests for recognition, 
external narratives also become part of the overall narrative and identity of the unrecognised 
state. Thus, non-recognition results in the evolution of an identity that not only reflects a 
shared history but also envisions a shared future. 
 
Local ownership, resilience, and strength 
Unrecognised states are not completely excluded from the international system, although 
most interaction with them falls under the guise of interaction or engagement with the parent 
state. For example, the UN presence in Somaliland is a component of the wider UN mission 
to Somalia, and the UK Department for International Development offers security advice to 
the ‘regional’ government of Somaliland as a development mechanism aimed at stabilizing 
Somalia rather than recognition of a separate political entity.46 Inter-state meetings held in 
London in January 2015 regarding the international fight against ISIS controversially did not 
include representatives from the government of Kurdistan, despite its role in fighting the 
armed group.47 Although political leadership may be recognized as political actors, hesitance, 
or even refusal to engage with unrecognised states as separate entities characterizes much of 
the international interaction,48 as relations in this regard can be seen as de facto recognition. 
As Oeter has begun to unpack, there are a myriad of complex reasons for this.49 Fear of 
setting a precedent, a desire to maintain the status of the international order, regional security 
considerations, deference to regional organizations or powerful actors, and aspirations for 
political rebuilding in parent states are just some of the considerations surrounding non-
recognition. What is important to remember, though, is that unrecognised states 
predominantly emerge out of conflict or territorial breakup, and that their lasting existence 
proves that they have built institutional and ideational ‘states’ in conditions in which 
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recognized states have failed to remain intact.50 They tend to be long-standing stable entities. 
In most instances, unrecognised states are more stable and peaceful than the states from 
which they emerged. They and their statebuilding processes are remarkably resilient; a 
resilience and strength that stems from the space of non-recognition. Indeed, stability in these 
entities exists not in spite of, but because of, their existence within the realm of non-
recognition. 
 
When external actors are dictating the empowerment of institutions, processes, and 
individuals, this excludes society and the processes of nation-building and state formation. In 
the literature analysing statebuilding, particularly in the more critical literature, this is often 
discussed in the language of legitimacy and is identified as the ‘operational challenge’ of 
local ownership.51 Because of the liberal assumptions underpinning the practice, in 
externally-led statebuilding the state is being built according to plan. External legitimacy is a 
primary concern, and the assumption is that domestic legitimacy will follow. However, local 
ownership has been an elusive or distant desire, even though it is necessary for the success of 
these projects and is seen by many as the ultimate goal to be achieved.52 This is also an area 
of focus because it is a question that cannot be answered simply: at what point does a state 
belong to the population? When the process of creating a state is an internal process rather 
than an external imposition, though, strong local ownership is a necessity for sustained 
existence as the state must be accepted and supported from within. For statebuilding in 
unrecognised states, the space created by non-recognition allows for – indeed demands – the 
problem of legitimacy to be flipped.53 
 
Unrecognised states have adopted a unique form of state formation that can be viewed 
as survival strategies54 characterized by statebuilding through self-reliance,55 self-
preservation, and self-maximization. This must be viewed in two parts. On one side is the 
external strategy, accommodating external structures and empirical demands in order to meet 
the expectations and preferences of external actors so as to best further the goals of 
recognition. As Caspersen notes, however, there is no single model of unrecognised state. 
The condition of non-recognition ‘does not fully determine the kind of entity that is likely to 
evolve’, and among unrecognised states there are variations not only in levels of recognition 
but also in outcomes in terms of governance style, levels of democratization, levels of 
monopolization of force, and levels of economic and political development.56 This 
comparative hierarchical analysis of the empirical does nothing more than give an indication 
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of how well the entity complies with external expectations of its target audiences, though. 
Stability in statebuilding is not entirely dependent on success at meeting these demands, 
although recognition might be. What is significant here is that unrecognised states comply 
with the normative rules of statehood expected by their target audience. If seeking 
recognition from a single patron state, an unrecognised state can be expected to reflect the 
expectations of that state. If seeking broad international recognition of sovereign statehood, 
most posit themselves as ‘good’ states and exhibit ‘acceptable’ liberal statehood. The two 
unrecognised states chosen here both exist within what are considered failed parent states and 
both lack patron states. For Somaliland, the primary audience is the international community, 
primarily the United States and Western Europe. Kurdistan also pitches to a global audience, 
but this is not limited to Western countries, and it includes states with interests in oil and gas 
development. However, many Eastern European unrecognised states exist within non-failed 
states and have a very strong patron in Russia. For this side of the survival strategies, non-
recognition dictates that survival rests with the aspiration of recognition – both in terms of 
formal recognition of sovereign statehood and in informal recognition through support, 
assistance and engagement – and meeting the demands of those from whom recognition is 
sought. 
 
As discussed earlier, the second side is meeting internal demands and expectations in 
order to maintain the domestic support and investment needed to sustain the process and the 
state. It is a simple equation, but one that is often overlooked: the widely held perception is 
that non-recognition is attached to the conditions of statehood, meaning that if the state goes 
away, prospects for recognition also go away. Because of the lack of external support or 
minimal external support, the survival of the statebuilding processes in unrecognised states 
depends on societal investment and support.57 As most external expectations discount the use 
of violence as a mechanism of compliance, this support is dependent upon providing what the 
population wants and expects of the state.58 This domestically targeted component of the 
survival strategy involves the creation of an identity and a narrative – nation-building – but it 
also involves ensuring the population continues to support the ongoing process of socio-
political change. Because of the flexibility granted by non-recognition, there is significant 
latitude in the exercising of sovereignty within unrecognised states, allowing for a deviation 
from the ‘blueprint’ model of statehood espoused in externally-led projects, and for a 
responsive and reciprocal relationship between the institutions of state and society. The state 
must be invested in society in order for society to remain invested in the state, fostering local 
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ownership and creating a lasting point of stability in the state that is not often found in 
externally-led statebuilding projects. 
 
While there are similarities in the detailed recognition strategies employed regardless 
of geographic region, as noted by Caspersen the outcomes vary because the identities, 
narratives, expectations, and demands of the entities vary, meaning the institutional 
components of the states reflect and respond to different conditions and demands.59 It is here 
that non-recognition grants the space for latitude and flexibility in not only creating an 
identity and a nation but also in creating and establishing institutions and practices that both 
conform to the demands of external legitimacy and work to meet the demands of domestic 
legitimacy. Together, a duality of legitimacy is created: external legitimacy as an acceptable 
state, and internal legitimacy that, because of non-recognition, is vital for sustaining the 
processes of statebuilding and ‘statehood’. Balancing external legitimacy with internal 
legitimacy is a prerequisite for unrecognised states, and the importance of popular trust and 
investment in the process of socio-political change that statebuilding brings is vital in 
creating lasting stability. In domestically-led statebuilding the process must be sustained from 
within, but at the same time the process and the leaders would not have the rhetorical power 
needed to build the state if it were not for the need to ‘comply to be recognized.’ Indeed, 
external recognition as a goal can maintain the domestic political and social cohesion needed 
to continue the existence of the state. External demands can, and must, come together with 
internal necessities as a mechanism of stability. 
 
In many ways, unrecognised states conform to what Ghani and Lockhart have 
identified as the ‘way of the future’ in statebuilding: states that fulfil their obligations of the 
right of sovereignty both externally and internally. In this, strategies are ‘inherently about 
“coproduction” because internal and external actors have to agree on rules, a division of 
labour and a sequence of activities’.60 In unrecognised states, though, local considerations are 
not a superficial inclusion, as within these entities there is a much greater pull on the 
necessity of domestic legitimacy. In projects characterized by direct engagement with the 
international community or external international actors, it is expected that the demands or 
desires of those external actors will be reflected in both the statebuilding project itself as well 
as in the resulting state.61 Although indirect, those demands are also identifiable in 
unrecognised states. In the space of non-recognition, though, there is something else at play. 
Without the exercising of external sovereignty, and with the flexibility and the need to 
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address and accommodate local concerns, demands, and political culture, statebuilding within 
the space of non-recognition is characterized by the state’s being propped up from within 
from the start rather than a supposed handing over at the end. Ironically, often the result more 
closely reflects the normative expectations of peaceful and stable statehood than those 
projects led from the outside. Arguably, statebuilding in the condition of non-recognition 
results in a more acceptable or desirable ‘state’ than statebuilding that takes places within 
recognized states. 
 
Conclusions: Playing in the Sandbox 
Not everything is ideal within the realm of non-recognition, and it would be remiss to leave 
that impression. Problems with existing as an unrecognised state are not uniform, just as the 
entities themselves are not uniform. Even to exclude all unrecognised states from all benefits 
of statehood is false, as some are included more than others. For example, because of its oil 
resources Kurdistan attracts significant amounts of foreign business and investment, despite 
the legal complexities that surround that. Because of the state of the Somalia government and 
Somaliland’s almost non-existent relationship with Mogadishu, Somalilanders have problems 
accessing passports and travel, whereas those within other unrecognised states do not have 
the same difficulty.  However, one key concern across these entities is within the relationship 
between state and society. This relationship is mutually beneficial, yet it is also a potential 
point of fragility in the unrecognised state. The state depends on societal support, and society 
expects the state to return on its promises for recognition and the benefits of statehood. The 
criteria for an entity to be considered an unrecognised state involve a minimum period of 
existence as a ‘state’, yet one of the great unknowns is how long that existence can, or will, 
continue. This is different for every entity, yet it is a complication of the period of non-
recognition. A big question remains, then: what happens if the promise of recognition is not 
fulfilled? 
 
This is not the only big question left lingering. With non-recognition playing such a 
vital role in propelling and stabilizing the statebuilding process and the resultant state, what 
happens if recognition does come? The quest for recognition provides strong motivations for 
maintaining stability and state-society cohesion, providing room to weather the storm and 
address obstacles, problems, or crises in a way that allows for a continuation of the state. 
Here, the space of recognition allows for political development and consolidation through an 
invocation of the common goal. However, if recognition is no longer a point of unification 
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and a rallying cry, and if maintaining peace, stability, and a working political system is no 
longer necessary to achieve that end, what happens when that vital factor within statebuilding 
and the maintenance of stability is removed? In unrecognised states, recognition and the 
promise of that is a political tactic that both the government and the people can organize 
around. These tactics will undoubtedly have to change if recognition is granted. Because of 
the socio-political dynamics within the space of non-recognition, the future of any 
unrecognised state is uncertain if recognition is achieved.  
 
Unrecognised states are certainly in a situation of limbo, but they are also in a 
precarious position in regards to what happens if recognition comes or if it does not. Existing 
in a state of non-recognition puts limitations on domestic politics; it creates a ‘comfort zone’ 
for the debates and practices of political and socio-political relationships, where the practices 
leading to the desired point of recognition are known and restrained. However, existing in a 
state of non-recognition also leaves these entities in the unknown. These dichotomous 
questions begin to point to the complexity of the politics of recognition and non-recognition, 
including within the realm of statebuilding. Recognition is simply a legal technicality in that 
it does not determine ‘statehood’. However, it carries a tremendous amount of power and 
significantly determines interaction between political entities in the international system. 
Those determinations carry not only weighty political considerations and complications, but 
at the same time, and especially in the ongoing processes of statebuilding and political 
development, significant benefits. Ironically, some of these benefits exist solely within the 
space of non-recognition. 
 
In the world of computer programming, engineers have developed areas within their 
systems that are known as ‘sandboxes’. The sandbox exists as an environment in which 
software can be tested before it is installed in live systems, allowing for variables to be 
tweaked and code to be rewritten without impacting on the ecosystem that surrounds it. The 
sandbox acts as a testing ground; some software projects will never see the light of day, while 
others will be released to become useful and sometimes vital additions to the computing 
environment. Sadly, no similar environment exists within politics. Changes take place in a 
real-time environment in which actions create reactions and the possibility of isolating events 
is limited. The last decade has seen a series of statebuilding trials that have attempted to 
rebuild and reorganize states. Unlike the computing ‘sandbox’, though, states cannot be cut 
off from their surrounding environment or the processes of politics. 
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However, the period of non-recognition can act as a type of sandbox. It provides the 
space and flexibility for states to develop institutions and nations, identities, and capabilities, 
before being surrounded by the complications and responsibilities of recognised statehood. It 
allows for a degree of agency over how the state is composed and functions, and when and 
where the state interacts with the international community. This agency should not be 
overstated, but isolation does force a degree of self-reliance before external engagement is 
undertaken, creating a possibility of a more resilient state emerging if recognition is granted.  
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